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Vedanta Resources Holdings Limited v ZCCM Investment Holdings Plc and Konkola 
Copper Mines Plc, CAZ/08/249/2019 
Sangwani Patrick Ng’ambi1 and Chanda Chungu2 
Facts 
In November 2004, the Government of the Republic of Zambia had concluded an agreement 
in which Vedanta Resources Holdings Limited (“Vedanta”), acquired a majority shareholding 
interest in Konkola Copper Mines (“KCM”). Following this acquisition, ZCCM Investment 
Holdings Plc (“ZCCM-IH”) negotiated and executed a Shareholders Agreement and Articles 
of Association. Among other things, the aforementioned agreements provided that Vedanta 
would be responsible for appointing the Chief Executive Officer, who in turn was responsible 
for appointing a Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer and other senior 
management. 
 
On 21st May 2019, the ZCCM-IH commenced winding up proceedings by way of a petition in 
the High Court of the Republic of Zambia with the view to wind up KCM based on the 
allegation that the mine was being mismanaged by Vedanta, contrary to the provisions of the 
Shareholders Agreement that was executed between the Appellants and the Respondents. In 
the petition filed by ZCCM-IH it was alleged that Vedanta had managed KCM in a manner that 
was detrimental to the interests of ZCCM-IH. Among other things it was alleged that: 
 
• Vedanta had only declared dividends five times in the fifteen years amounting to a total 
of USD 67.105 Million. Furthermore, Vedanta had failed to pay ZCCM-H the sum of 
USD 10,305,000.00 which was the latter’s share of the dividend, despite the fact that 
it was declared in 2013; 
• Vedanta had operated at a loss for the preceding seven years. Cumulatively these losses 
amounted to USD 1.2623 billion; 
• Vedanta was not able to meet its operating costs between 2013 and 2019; 
• The company was failing to pay its debts. For example, it owed Copperbelt Energy 
Corporation Plc the sum of USD 24,064,722  and Ndola Lime sums of USD 468,036.25 
and ZMW 199,941;  
• Vedanta had been operating in a manner that was not environmentally friendly or 
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sustainable. They had polluted and continued to pollute water sources in and around 
the mining licence areas. Consequently, they were found liable for polluting the Kafue 
River by the Supreme Court of Zambia under Appeal No. 1 of 2012;  
• They had provided a mining plan pursuant to section 35(1)(b) of the Mines and 
Minerals Development Act, 2015 and failed to abide by it. For example, they had failed 
to develop the mining areas in Chingola and Chililabombwe and to carry out mining 
operations with due diligence. This meant that they continued to operate below 
capacity. Failure to adhere to the requirements of the Mines and Minerals Development 
Act, meant that the Ministry of Mines issued a default notice against Vedanta.  
• That at the same time that the winding up proceedings where commenced, the ZCCM-
IH obtained an ex-parte order appointing a Provisional Liquidator over Konkola 
Copper Mines and the order of appointment gave the Provisional Liquidator very wide 
powers over and above the requirement to preserve the assets of the company. 
 
Vedanta applied for a stay of execution in these liquidation proceedings because the 
Shareholders Agreement between the Government of Zambia and Vedanta, contained an 
arbitration clause.3 Under this arbitration clause, all disputes arising out of the Shareholders 
Agreement were to be settled by arbitration. The term ‘dispute’ was defined quite broadly in 
the Shareholders Agreement.4 Vedanta contended that since ZCCM-IH felt that KCM was 
being managed in a manner that was detrimental, there was a dispute between the parties as per 
the Shareholders Agreement, and therefore it should be referred to arbitration.5 
 
Counsel for Vedanta contended that since there was an arbitration clause, the Court was 
compelled to stay the liquidation proceedings and accordingly refer the matter to arbitration, 
by virtue of section 10 of the Arbitration Act of 2000.6 This is because section 10 of the 
Arbitration Act was couched in mandatory terms. The aforementioned provision says that: 
 
(1) A court before which legal proceedings are brought in a matter which is the 
subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so requests at any stage of the 
proceedings and notwithstanding any written law, stay those proceedings and refer 
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the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed.  
(2) Where proceedings referred to in subsection (1) have been brought, arbitral 
proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or continued, and an award may be 
made, while the issue is pending before the court.  
 
In advancing their argument, Counsel for Vedanta argued relied on the case of Konkola Copper 
Mines v NFC Africa Mining (2006), under which the Supreme Court held that where there is 
an arbitration clause and a party applies for a stay of proceedings under section 10 of the 
Arbitration Act, the Court has no choice but to refer a matter to arbitration. The only exception 
to this rule, is if the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
performance.  
 
The High Court disagreed. In their view this was not a proper case to refer the parties to 
arbitration. As far as the High Court was concerned, the arbitration agreement was “null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”. The court acknowledged that section 10 
was couched in mandatory terms.7 However, it noted that this same section also provided that 
the Court should refuse to stay proceedings in the event that it finds that the arbitration clause 
is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.8  
 
The High Court held that it had exclusive jurisdiction to oversee the liquidation proceedings. 
The ultimate aim of such proceedings was to protect third parties.9 Included in the category of 
third parties are the creditors of a company which is to be wound up. The High Court noted 
that creditors had already filed their Notices of Intention to be heard in the winding-up petition. 
Thus, despite the fact that there was a dispute between the parties to the Shareholders 
Agreement, the Court had a duty to consider the interests of third parties, in the matter before 
it.  
 
The High Court opined that where third party rights were involved in liquidation proceedings, 
“the private agreement between shareholders and a company to submit their dispute to 
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arbitration is displaced and rendered inoperative.”10 This is owing to the fact that the other 
competing interests are completely separate from the interests of the parties to the arbitration 
process. The former thus supersedes the latter because it can only be taken care of through the 
court process.11  
In addition to this, the Court was of the view that the arbitration agreement itself did not apply 
to the creditors, whose Notice of Intention to be heard was already before the court.12 Given 
this fact, the arbitration agreement was inapplicable. As such, the High Court dismissed the 
application to stay the liquidation proceedings.13  
 
Grounds for Appeal 
Dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court, Vedanta launched an appeal before the Court 
of Appeal.  Among other things, Vedanta contended that after finding that there was in fact an 
arbitrable dispute between the parties, the learned High Court judge should have referred the 
matter to arbitration, pursuant to section 10(1) of the Arbitration Act.14 Furthermore, Vedanta 
contended that the learned judge erred in finding that the arbitration clause was inoperable.  
 
Holding 
The Court of Appeal held that Vedanta had substantially succeeded in its appeal against the 
High Court’s refusal to stay proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration.15 This was owing 
to the fact that inter alia that there was indeed a dispute between the parties as defined in the 
Shareholders Agreement. In addition to this, the Court of Appeal held that Vedanta possessed 
the requisite locus standi to apply for a stay of the winding up petition and refer the matter to 
arbitration. Moreover, the Court of Appeal opined that the disputes between the parties were 
referable to arbitration. As such, the arbitration agreement between the parties was indeed 
arbitrable.16  
 
The Court of Appeal opined that there was indeed a dispute between the parties.  The Court 
first looked at the meaning of ‘dispute’ under the Shareholders Agreement, which defined it as 
meaning, “any dispute, disagreement, controversy, claim or difference of whatsoever nature 
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arising under, out of, in connection with or relating (in any manner whatsoever) to this 
Agreement or the interpretation or performance of this Agreement or the breach, termination 
or validity thereof.”17 Moreover, under Clause 26.1 of the Shareholders Agreement, the parties 
consented to submit “any dispute” to arbitration.   
 
The Court of Appeal opined that according to Clause 3 of the Shareholders Agreement, the 
primary object of the company was to conduct business and carry it out in accordance with 
scheduled programmes.18 The main business of KCM was mining. The fact that ZCCM-IH had 
taken issue with the manner in which mining operations were being conducted meant that there 
was a dispute which fell “clearly within the ambit of arbitration as agreed”.19 
 
The Court contended that the matter should be referred to arbitration because the dispute 
concerned here arises from the performance of obligations imposed on KCM and Vedanta 
under the Shareholders Agreement. The Court of Appeal contended that the case of Ody’s Oil 
Company,20 on which the High Court based its decision, was distinguishable and opined that: 
 
In that case the court refused to refer the matter to arbitration because the contractual agreement 
was tainted with illegality. In addition to this, another party which was a stranger to the arbitration 
agreement was involved. The court was of the view that referring part of the case to arbitration 
would lead to multiplicity of actions, which could result in conflicting decisions.  
 
The Court of Appeal opined that that was not the case here. The grievances arose from the 
Shareholders Agreement and was a dispute among the shareholders. As such, the interests of 
third party creditors did not arise, because third party creditors were not precluded from 
approaching the court in their own right. As such, the Court of Appeal found that the arbitration 
agreement was operative and capable of performance between the parties to the Shareholders 
Agreement.21 The Court of Appeal thus set aside the decision of the High Court, ordered a stay 
of the winding up proceedings and referred the matter to arbitration as requested by Vedanta.  
 
Significance  
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As a general rule, the arbitration clause forms the basis of the arbitration. By entering into an 
agreement to arbitrate, the parties essentially commit to submit certain disputes which may 
arise to arbitration, rather than the Courts. As such, the parties grant jurisdictional powers to 
private individuals (the arbitrators) to determine their dispute and issue an arbitral award 
thereafter. This fact is underscored in section 10(1) of the Arbitration Act, No. 19 of 2000 
which says: 
 
A court before which legal proceedings are brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration 
agreement shall, if a party so requests at any stage of the proceedings and notwithstanding any 
written law, stay those proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.  
 
Therefore, as a general rule, the courts must refer a matter to arbitration, where there is an 
arbitration clause, provided one of the parties requests the matter be referred to arbitration. The 
Court of Appeal in the earlier case of Beza Consulting Inc. Limited v Bari Zambia Limited and 
Gidey Genremariam Egziabher,22 gave guidance when they stated that: 
 
What section 10 [of the Arbitration Act] does, however, is to require the ouster of the 
Court’s jurisdiction to be triggered by a request by a party to the arbitration agreement, 
which party must also be a party to the proceedings. 
 
Based on the foregoing Court of Appeal authority, which was confirmed in the Vedanta 
judgment, before the Court can consider referring the matter to arbitration, all the parties to the 
proceedings before it must also be parties to the arbitration agreement, and at least one of them 
must refer it to arbitration. Indeed, in both Beza Consulting and the Vedanta case, the Court of 
Appeal confirmed that the only exception to this rule that the matter must be referred to 
arbitration is where the court finds that the arbitration clause is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed. According to the Court of Appeal, third party interests do not 
fall within the stipulated exceptions.  
 
The Court of Appeal’s decision to quash that of the High Court is a welcome one. Investors 
elect to have disputes settled through arbitration for a plethora of reasons. The first is that it is 
relatively quicker than litigation through the national courts. Litigation disputes can take 
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several years to bring to finality. Arbitration on the other hand, can take only a matter of 
months. There is also greater confidentiality during the arbitral proceedings. Moreover, 
investors are more confident of having their dispute heard in a neutral forum, because arbitral 
proceedings take place above the fray of the justice system of the host State. This decision 
ensures that where there is a dispute, the investor can still have their dispute heard expeditiously 
and in a neutral forum, without the other party using the courts as a delaying tactic. Holding 
otherwise would have set a bad precedent for the area of International Commercial Arbitration 
in Zambia.  
 
This decision by the Court of Appeal is also welcome, as it shows that the courts are an effective 
buffer against the resource nationalism cycle. The advanced stages of the resource nationalism 
cycle invariably manifest, when the State seeks to exercise greater control over natural resource 
development and to limit the operations of the investor.23 This is typically sparked by an 
increase in the prices of natural resources on the international market. In such instances, the 
State wishes to gain more revenue from its natural resource, either by reversing any tax breaks 
the investor has previously enjoyed, or outrightly nationalizing their assets.24  
 
Whether or not a resource rich nation succeeds in that endeavour, depends largely on its 
institutions and the checks and balances that exist. Where institutions are weak, it is easier for 
the host State to pursue a resource nationalist agenda.25 Where institutions are strong and 
independent, it is a lot harder for the host State to do so. This decision of the Court of Appeal 
demonstrates that there exist institutional constraints in the form of checks and balances. As 
such, the Zambian judiciary has demonstrated that it can be a highly effective buffer against 
the resource nationalism cycle in Zambia.  
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